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In this paper we test for the impact of foreign exchange intervention on both the level of the 
yen/dollar exchange rate and the volatility in the yen/dollar markets. Using newly released 
data on Japanese foreign exchange intervention, our global GARCH estimation suggests that 
Japanese foreign exchange interventions between 1991 and 2002 had the intended effect, but 
at the cost of higher exchange rate volatility. Testing for the robustness of this finding we 
show that the results are highly dependent on the time period. From 1991 to 1998 Japan’s 
official currency purchases were unsuccessful and coincided with increased e xchange rate 
volatility. Since 1999 official Japanese currency purchases seem to have had the intended 
effect while exchange rate volatility is lower. To this end, the paper provides evidence for 
successful foreign exchange intervention in Japan’s liquidity trap where the borderline b e-
tween sterilized and unsterilized foreign exchange intervention became blurred. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Japan’s persistent post-bubble blues is characterized by a combination of economic sta gnation 
and a strong currency (Schnabl 2001). While real growth of Japanese GDP during the 1990s 
approached the zero bound, the exchange rate of the Japanese yen has been surprisingly 
strong. With the Japanese export sector remaining the most reliable pillar of the ailing econ-
omy, Japanese monetary authorities2 have been more and more tempted to sustain output by 
dollar purchases. Japanese foreign exchange intervention has dwarfed official US official for-
eign currency transactions, in particular since the early 1990s, both in terms of single inter-
vention events and in terms of cumulated intervention volume (Figure 1 and Figure 2).  
  
[Figure 1 and Figure 2 about here] 
 
With the sustained depression of the Japanese economy—and with fiscal and monetary policy 
at their limits—many authors have proposed reviving the Japanese economy by even more 
(un-) sterilized foreign exchange intervention (McCallum, 2000 and Svensson, 2001). To d e-
termine the pros and cons of this policy proposition we scrutinize the impact of sterilized for-
eign exchange intervention on both the level and the volatility of the yen/dollar exchange rate.  
  In contrast to former studies, which were mostly based on perceived intervention re-
ported by press and wires services, we use newly revealed data on foreign exchange interve n-
tion (instead of dummy variables) for our inquiry.
3 Japan provides a particularly interesting 
case for studying the effects of foreign exchange intervention because now data are available, 
and intervention volumes are exceptionally high for a freely floating currency. 
  A GARCH model with interventions as exogenous variables for mean and volatility is 
fitted to the institutional setting of Japanese foreign exchange intervention. To cope with pos-
sible bias caused by parameter changes during the observation period local coefficients for 
means and volatility are estimated. A change point detector allows the identification of vola-
tility clusters that are matched with intervention periods. The segments computed by the 
change point detector are used to re-estimate our GARCH model based on non-arbitrary seg-
mentation.  
                                                   
2   According to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law (article 7, paragraph 3), the Ministry of Finance 
is in charge of Japanese foreign exchange intervention. The central bank acts solely as an agent (Article 36 
and article 40; paragraph 2, Bank of Japan Law) and buys or sells foreign currency on the government’s ac-
count. 
3   Frenkel, Pierdzioch and Stadtmann (2003) use the newly revealed data to examine the accuracy of former 
data sets on perceived intervention showing the deviations of the data set by Ramaswamy and Samiei (2000) 
from the de facto data.   4 
2. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND 
The discussion on the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention has been focused p ri-
marily on so -called sterilized intervention, which neutralizes the effects of official currency 
purchases on the monetary base and thereby the interest rate.
4 Unsterilized intervention, 
which allows foreign exchange intervention to change the monetary base, is excluded from 
the discussion because it clearly affects the exchange rate as any other form of monetary pol-
icy. Japan’s foreign exchange intervention can be assumed to be completely and instantane-
ously sterilized, as is generally the case for the central banks that issue the major international 
currencies (Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of Japan).
5 
Since the so-called Jurgensen report (Jurgensen 1983) there has been a broad discus-
sion as to whether sterilized foreign exchange intervention is capable of successfully targeting 
a certain level of the exchange rate.
6 The portfolio balance models—based on the assumption 
that foreign and domestic assets are imperfect substitutes—argued that sterilized intervention 
can effect the exchange rate by changing the relative supplies and thereby the relative returns 
of foreign and domestic assets (Rogoff 1984).
7  
An empirical test of the portfolio balance model by Dominguez and Frankel (1993) 
supported this view for Japanese foreign exchange intervention between 1984 and 1990. More 
recently Ramaswamy and Samiei (2000) argued that Japanese foreign exchange interventions 
in the yen/dollar market during the 1990s have been “at least partially effective” and that even 
sterilized interventions have mattered in the yen/dollar market. Without examining the trans-
mission channel, an extensive study by Ito (2002) concludes that Japanese foreign exchange 
intervention under “Mr. Yen” Eisuke Sakakibara have produced the intended effects on the 
yen/dollar rate during the 1990s. Fatum and Hutchison (1999) find evidence for successful 
sterilized foreign exchange intervention of Japanese monetary authorities based on an event 
study approach. Based on a broad variety of GARCH estimations Beine and Szafarz (2003) 
                                                   
4   Every buying or selling of foreign exchange by the monetary authorities alters the monetary base. If, for 
instance, the Japanese central bank buys foreign exchange from financial institutions as an agent of the Mi n-
istry of Finance, the official foreign reserves increase. The central bank transfers the value of the foreign cur-
rency purchase to the current deposits of the financial institutions at the central bank. Since the current depos-
its of financial institutions are a part of the monetary base, the monetary base will increase and money market 
interest rates will fall.  
5   Takagi (1991) gives empirical evidence for the pre-1991 period. We will return to this assumption in section 
6. 
6   Sarno and Taylor (2001) give a comprehensive overview. 
7   Further the so-called signalling effect is identified as an effective transmission channel of sterilized foreign 
exchange intervention. But as successful signalling announces a change in fundamentals (interest rate) it can 
be regarded as (a first step of) unsterilized intervention.   5 
find Japan ese foreign exchange intervention successful —in particular if coordinated with the 
US. 
In contrast, Sarno and Taylor (2001) argue that—at least among the currencies of the 
major industrial countries where capital markets have become increasingly integrated  and the 
degree of substitutability between financial assets has increased—sterilized intervention does 
not affect exchange rates through the portfolio channel. According to Dominguez (1998) ster-
ilized foreign exchange intervention is by definition unsuccessful, as it leaves the domestic 
money supply unchanged. If the official foreign currency transactions do not affect domestic 
interest rates—and thus do not trigger adjustments in the international investment portfolios—
the intervention volumes are too small in relation to the huge international foreign exchange 
markets to have a sustained effect.  
The impact of foreign exchange intervention on volatility in fo reign exchange markets 
has also been discussed. Assuming rational expectations Dominguez (1998) suggests that 
fully credible and unambiguous sterilized foreign exchange intervention can reduce volatility 
in efficient foreign exchange markets. Based on a stochastic model with chartists and funda-
mentalists, De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2003) show that systematic sterilized intervention can 
be effective by reducing noise generated by chartist forecast rules. Jeanne and Rose (2002) 
assume endogenous noise trading and argue that it is possible to reduce exchange rate vol atil-
ity without sacrificing monetary autonomy. 
In contrast, Schwartz (1996) contends that foreign exchange intervention is an “exer-
cise in futility” which is likely to increase uncertainty and volatility. Bonser-Neal and Tanner 
(1996) support Schwartz’s analysis using implied volatilities of currency option prices, with 
which they find that Japanese foreign exchange intervention increased the volatility in the 
yen/dollar foreign exchange markets during the p eriod from 1987 to 1991. Galati and Melick 
(1999) contend for the period from 1993 to 1996 that Japanese foreign exchange intervention 
has increased foreign exchange traders’ uncertainty regarding future exchange rate move-
ments. Watanabe and Harada (2001) apply a component GARCH model to Japan’s foreign 
exchange intervention between 1990 to 2000 and find a significant effect on short-term but 
not on long-term yen/dollar volatility. 
All in all, although Sarno and Taylor (2001: 862) argue that the recent literature gives 
more evidence in favor of effectiveness—the theoretical and empirical evidence for the ef-
fects of foreign exchange intervention on the level and volatility of the yen/dollar exchange 
rate remains mixed. The stylized facts about Japanese foreign exchange intervention give evi-
dence for both sides. The frequent intervention of the Japanese Ministry of Finance in the   6 
yen/dollar market might be taken as an indicator of success since repeated failure would dis-
courage intervention. Also recently financial press reports might indicate a growing trust in 
the success of Japanese interventions. But the persistence of Japanese foreign exchange inter-




To test for the impact of foreign exchange intervention on the level and volatility of the 
yen/dollar exchange rate we use daily data provided by Datastream, the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance and the Federal Reserve Board. The observation period is from April 1, 1991—when 
the first data on Japanese foreign exchange intervention became available—up to December 
31, 2002. This corresponds to a sample size of 3066 observations. 
The data on the yen/dollar exchange rate are daily closing spot prices by Datastream 
from the European foreign exchange market (5 p.m. Greenwich). We analyse the log returns 
of the exchange rate series. The statistical pr operties of the first log differences time series are 
reported in Table 1 in comparison to the German mark/dollar exchange rate. The respective 
daily returns and volatilities (defined as squared returns) are plotted in Figure 3.  
In Table 1 the negative mean and skewnes represent the prevailing yen appreciation 
pressure against the dollar. A larger standard deviation than for the mark/dollar rate indicates 
increased exchange rate volatility (Figure 3). The kurtosis is significantly above 3 represent-
ing a leptokurtic distribution of yen/dollar exchange rate returns.
8  
Daily data on Japanese foreign exchange intervention are provided by the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance starting in April 1, 1991. The amounts are in billion yen subdivided into 
purchases and sales of dollar, mark (euro) and other (negligible) currencies. Since we focus 
on the yen/dollar exchange rate, only dollar transactions are included in our sample and the 
yen amounts are converted into trillion dollars based on daily exchange rates.9 On 3066 trad-
ing days the Ministry of Finance reports 215 dollar i ntervention days—182 dollars purchases 
and 33 dollar sales (Table 2).  
The US foreign exchange intervention data are provided courtesy of the Federal Re-
serve Board sub-divided into yen, mark10 and other currencies purchased and sold. The scale 
is in million dollars, which is then converted into trillion dollars. For Japan as well, only the 
yen transactions are included into the sample. The Federal Reserve Board reports 22 interven-
                                                   
8   This does not constitute a problem for our GARCH estimation because the specification by Bollerslev (1986) 
takes a time dependent variance—as a possible reason for leptokurtis—into account. 
9   The data transformation into trillions makes the estimated coefficients more readable without changing their 
levels of significance. 
10   No US intervention has taken place since the introduction of the euro.   7 
tion days in the yen/dollar market for the observation period —18 days wi th dollar purchases 
(yen sales) and 4 days with dollar sales (yen purchases). 
To control for disturbances in other asset markets, as proposed by Bonser-Neal and 
Tanner (1996), we use daily notations of Japanese and US stock indices—the Nikkei 300 for 
Japan  and the Dow Jones Industrial Average for the US as provided by Datastream.  
  The augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) test as well as the Philips and Perron (1988) 
test reject the unit root hypothesis for the daily changes of the yen/dollar rate, the Nikkei 300, 
the DOW Jones Industrial Average as well as for (absolute) intervention data at all common 
confidence levels.  
4. GARCH ESTIMATION 
To measure the impact of foreign exchange intervention on both the level and volatility of the 
yen/dollar rate we use a GARCH model with exogenous intervention data in both the condi-
tional mean and variance equations as proposed by Engle (1982), Bollerslev (1986), and Bai l-
lie/Bollerslev (1989). 
  Prior studies have defined volatility in different ways—long-term movements of ex-
change rate prices as plotted in Figure 4 and percentage exchange rate changes, e.g. absolute 
or squared returns, as plotted in Figure 5 for daily data.  For instance, the Louvre-target zones 
between dollar, yen and German mark (established in February 1987) were intended to reduce 
exchange rate volatility in terms of long-term movements of exchange rate prices.11 This im-
plies that intervention took place when the exchange rate approached a certain exchange rate 
(price) level.  
 
[Figure 4 and Figure 5 about here] 
 
  Similarly, Japanese foreign exchange intervention tried to prevent the yen from falling 
to above about 150 yen/dollar in 1998, rising above about 105 yen/dollar in 1999/2000, 117 to 
120 yen/dollar in 2001, or 115 to 122 yen/dollar in spring 2003. 12 We interpret these attempts 
to smooth the long-term movements as targeting the exchange rate level. The impact of for-
eign exchange intervention on the exchange rate level is captured by the mean equation of our 
GARCH model.  
                                                   
11   The communiqué stated that current exchange rates were “broadly consistent with underlying fundamentals” 
(Funabashi 1988) which implied target zones around the (by that time) present levels. 
12   These unofficial, perceived exchange rate targets were reported in the financial press.   8 
In contrast, Dominguez (1998) defines volatility as squared returns. There are two 
possible directions of causality between such short-term exchange rate volatility and foreign 
exchange intervention. In liberalized foreign exchange markets exchange rate volatility is 
high because of a large number of private foreign exchange transactions. If—as o bserved in 
many countries with hard or soft peg exchange rate arrangements
13—monetary authorities 
want to reduce this exchange rate volatility substantially, intervention is conducted on a day -
to-day basis. Exchange rate volatility triggers intervention.  
In contrast, the central banks of the large industrial countries (Federal Reserve, Euro-
pean Central Bank, Bank of Japan) operate under monetary policy frameworks that target and 
smooth short-term interest rates. Exchange rates float freely. To sustain the interest rate target, 
foreign exchange intervention can take place only infrequently and on a discretionary basis.14 
As p er definition foreign exchange intervention remains erratic and  mainly unexpected, the 
causation is probable to run from intervention to volatility rather than vice versa. 
4.1. Specification 
 
Table 2 summarizes the stylized facts of Japanese and US foreign exchange intervention and 
gives the necessary information for the GARCH model specification. First, we observe that in 
contrast to the US, Japanese foreign exchange intervention is highly focused on the yen/dollar 
market. Since 97.48% of Japanese foreign exchange intervention is against the US dollar
15, 
we exclude other yen exchange rates—for instance against the euro (German m ark b efore 
1999)—from the investigation. 
Second, Japan has a much higher propensity to intervene in foreign exchange markets 
than the US both in terms of intervention days and absolute intervention volume. The number 
of intervention days in the yen/dollar  market is almost tenfold (Japan 215, US 22) and the 
discrepancy between the transactions volumes is even more pronounced (300.98 billion dol-
lars in Japan and 8.4 billion dollars in the US). We further observe that all 22 US intervention 
days in the yen/dollar markets coincide with Japanese intervention days,16 working parallel. 
This implies that US intervention is triggered by Japanese intervention
17 and we are faced 
with multicollinearity.  
                                                   
13   McKinnon and Schnabl (2003) show that such strategies are observed in many smaller East Asian countries 
as Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore.  
14   As shown in Table 2 even the Bank of Japan—which is regarded as very active in foreign exchange mar-
kets— intervened on 222 of 3066 trading days which corresponds to an unconditional probability of interven-
tion of 7.24% (Federal Reserve 1.17%). 
15   48.7% of US foreign exchange intervention is against the yen during the observation period. 
16   For the observation period the conditional probability of US intervention on Japanese intervention is 100%. 
17   Ito (2002) and Sakakibara (2000) give anecdotal evidence.   9 
To deal with both the asymmetric scope of intervention and multicollinearity, we add 
US and Japanese foreign exchange intervention to create one exogenous variable I—which 
represents Japan’s efforts to redirect the yen/dollar rate. This specification is justified by the 
fact that US intervention is only in support of Japanese intervention and prior tests with solely 
Japanese intervention as the exogenous variable did not yield significantly different results (as 
US intervention is negligible). Sarno and Taylor (2002: 846) argue that coordinated sterilized 
intervention between two or more countries might convince speculators that the signalled pol-
icy is more credible as opposed to a single-country intervention. Yet a dummy for coordinated 
intervention has remained insignificant for the US-Japanese case since 1991.  
Third, dollar purchases in Japan clearly dominate intervention activities (Figure  1). 
Out of 215 intervention days dollars were purchased on 182 intervention days (84.65%), on 
33 days (15.34%) dollars were sold. In terms of absolute intervention volumes (in dollars) 
263.63 billion dollars were purchased (87.50%) and 37.62 billion dollars were sold (12.50%). 
Due to the comparatively small amount of Japanese dollar sales we do not estimate the effects 
of dollar purchases and dollar sales separately, but treat intervention as one time series with 
positive (dollar purchases) and negative signs (dollar sales).
18  
 
 [Table 2 about here] 
 
This leads to the following GARCH specific ation: 
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In equation (1) rt denotes the logarithmic returns of the yen/dollar spot exchange rate (condi-
tional mean) as plotted in the upper left panel of Figure 3. The exchange rate is assumed to be 
influenced by official foreign currency transactions I. The deviation of the exchange rate from 
a certain bliss point increases the probability of foreign intervention as suggested by Figure 4 
and shown by Frenkel, Pierdzioch and Stadtmann (2003a).19 It precedes unambiguously the 
                                                   
18   This assumption will be relaxed below by the estimation of yearly local coefficients. 
19   Ito (2002) specifies this bliss point to 125 yen/dollar during the 1990s.   10 
exchange rate changes measured at 5 p.m. Greenwich time, as Japanese foreign exchange 
intervention is performed in the Japanese markets and US intervention is negligible.
20 
    As proposed by Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) we include the daily returns of Japa-
nese and US stock markets—Nikkei 300 and DOW Jones Industrial—as exogenous variables 
to control for the impact of disturbances in other asset markets.
21 We do not include any 
dummies for the announcement of interest rate changes, since prior estimations with dummies 
did not yield any significant results.22 In contrast to Dominguez (1998) and Baillie and Oster-
berg (1997) we do not include dummy variables for the day of the week and holidays for the 
sake of brevity. 
    In equation (2) the disturbances et are modelled as normally distributed conditional on 
the information set Wt-1 available at time t-1, with zero mean and variance h t. Equation (3) 
models the volatility of the yen/dollar exch ange rate as plotted in the lower left panel of 
Figure 3. The variance h t depends on past disturbances e t-i, the lagged variance ht-j, the abso-
lute official foreign currency intervention |It|,23 and the volatility in the Japanese and US share 




t DOW .  
    To capture the immediate impact of foreign exchange intervention on exchange rate 




t DOW  are not 
lagged in the volatility equation. This specification incorporates the danger of simultaneity 
bias, as foreign exchange intervention might take place in periods of increased exchange rate 
volatility (for instance during the 1997 Asian and 1998 Japanese financial crisis). Further-
more, expected foreign exchange intervention could enhance exchange rate volatility prior to 
intervention.  
    As volatility tends to persist over longer time periods in clusters lagging the volatility 
term is not a promising approach to address the simultaneity bias. Although some central 
bank intervention reaction functions include volatility as exogenous variable (Baillie and Os-
terberg 1997 or Frenkel, Pierdzioch and Stadtmann  2003b)  we assume that volatility is ex-
ogenous as explained in section 4.
24 
                                                   
20   Estimations with only Japanese interventions yields by-and-large the same results. 
21   The correlation between the Nikkei and DOW series does not affect our main findings. 
22   As shown by Watanabe (1994), Japanese foreign exchange intervention might signal a change in fundamen-
tals (monetary policy)—at least before 1999 when nominal interest rates reached the zero bound. The failure 
to trace the impact of the announced interest rate changes on the exchange rate might be due to the fact that 
markets gradually anticipate interest rate changes. 
23   We assume that dollar sales and dollar purchases affect the volatility in the same way. 
24   The Granger tests, not reported here, give evidence for causality from volatility to interventions. Beside the 
caveat that precedence does not necessarily imply causality (Black 1976) we reject this finding due to the 
reasons listed above.   11 
    The lag-structure of our GARCH model is specified by the Bayes information criterion 
(BIC) for models of the order  { } 4 , , 1 K ˛ p  and  { } 4 , , 1 K ˛ q . The BIC information criteria 
adopts the minimum for the global GARCH(1,2) specification.  
4.2. Global Results 
 
Table 3 reports the estimates of equations (1) to (3) on daily data between April 1, 1991, and 
December 31, 2002.
25 The GARCH parameters ai and bi are highly significant, indicating a 
strong explanatory power. The intervention coefficient b 1  is positive and highly significant, 
providing evidence for successful intervention on the same day. 26 Dollar purchases (yen sales) 
seem to induce yen depreciation; dollar sales (yen purchases) seem to induce yen apprecia-
tion.
27 Further, we observe that movements in the US and Japanese stock markets are strongly 
related to exchange rate movements on the same day, as portfolios are adjusted across bor-
ders.  
  The coefficient g1 estimates the impact of the absolute foreign exchange intervention 
on the volatility of the yen/dollar exchange rate. In contrast to Watanabe and Harada (2003) 
we find clear coincidence between Japanese foreign exchange intervention and yen/dollar 
volatility at the 1 percent level. This finding is consistent with  Figure 5, which plots absolute 
foreign exchange intervention and yen/dollar exchange rate volatilities defined as 60 days 
rolling standard deviations. Japan’s discretionary foreign exchange intervention seems to in-
crease uncertainty among traders and thereby exchange rate volatility. We also find that the 
volatility in stock markets i s linked to exchange rate volatility since investors adjust their 
portfolios across borders. This finding supports our attempt to control for volatility in other 
asset markets. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
To this end the global GARCH estimation yields evidence in favour of successful foreign 
exchange intervention as suggested by Ito (2002) and Fatum and Hutchison (2002). The im-
pact of foreign exchange intervention on exchange rate volatility is in line with Schwartz 
(1996), Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) and Galati and Melick (1999). 
                                                   
25   The estimations were carried out with EViews. 
26   Lagging the intervention variable by one day yields insignificant coefficients.  
27   Given the positive sign we can exclude the possibility that we measure causality from the exchange rate to 
intervention (leaning against the wind), as this would require a negative sign (yen appreciation triggers dollar 
purchases).   12 
4.3. Local Results 
Although the GARCH estimation of section 4.1 provides a clear result for the impact of Japa-
nese foreign exchange intervention, it gives only one comprehensive result for the whole ob-
servation period. The global estimation might not account for parameter changes that are  for 
instance frequently observed for the volatility of financial time series.  
  Comparing the sum of autoregressive parameters for the global GARCH estimations 
with and without exogenous variables provides evidence for parameter changes. The global 
GARCH(1,1) estimation without e xogenous variables yields a  l equal to 0.98 
( ￿ ￿ + = i i b a l ) which corresponds to a mean reversion time of about 50 days. The esti-
mated sum of autoregressive parameters being close to unity indicates that parameter changes 
might not be accounted for (Hillebrand 2003). In contrast, the estimation of the GARCH 
model with exogenous variables as specified in equations (1) to (3) yields l equal to 0.92, 
which in turn corresponds to a mean reversion time of about 12 days when the intervention 
term is introduced. The reduction of the time of mean reversion (smaller l) shows that the 
interventions at least coincided and possibly caused the parameter changes in volatility. 
  To cope with  this problem we re-estimate our GARCH model for sub-periods as pro-
posed by Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996). In a fist step we subdivide our observation period 
into calendar years. Although this partition is somewhat arbitrary we get a notion of changing 
parameters. The results of the local yearly GARCH estimations are reported in Table 4. There 
seems to be a change in the effects of Japanese foreign exchange intervention starting in 1999. 
In the period between 1991 and 1998 there is no significant impact from foreign exchange 
intervention on the mean despite considerable intervention volume and a large number of in-
tervention events. Intervention seems to have increased exchange rate vol atility in the years 
1993 to 1995.  
  In the second sub-period starting in 1999 the results undergo a change. In all four 
years up to 2002 the intervention coefficients b 1 are positive and highly significant. Japanese 
foreign exchange intervention seems successful during this time period. The impact on ex-
change rate volatility is less clear-cut. After 1998 negative signs dominate (except for 2001), 
but are mostly insignificant. Only in the year 2000 foreign exchange interventions seem to 
have reduced exchange rate volatility significantly at the 10% level. The combination of suc-
cessful foreign exchange intervention and reduced exchange rate volatility might not be acci-
dental, as successful intervention reduces the scope of appreciation and thus dampens relative 
exchange rate changes on the respective day.   13 
  Understanding that data segmentation considerably affects our estimation results we 
have pursued an alternative approach. Beine and Szafarz (2003: 6) suggest that Japanese for-
eign exchange intervention exhibits clear patterns of clusters. Based on Figure 1 we build 
eight periods of intervention clusters, which are indicated by the numbered bars in the lower 
part of the Figure. Then we set the boundaries of the segments mid-way b etween the last and 
the first day of each intervention period. Although these intervention clusters are again chosen 
somewhat arbitrarily we obtain additional evidence on the effect of data segmentation.  
  The main findings as reported in  Table 5 widely match the findings of the yearly esti-
mations. Between 1991 and 1998 Japanese foreign exchange intervention seems to have been 
ineffective and between 1994 and 1996 it seems to have increased exchange rate volatility. 
Starting from late 1998 there is strong evidence for effective foreign exchange intervention. In 
contrast to the yearly estimations, the intervention coefficients in the volatility equation are 
not only negative but also highly significant. Thus, since 1999 successful Jap anese foreign 
exchange intervention has coincided with reduced exchange rate volatility at highly signifi-
cant levels.  
  Based on the findings reported in Table 4 and Table 5 we identify two sub-periods in 
which Japanese foreign exchange intervention had different i mpacts on exchange rate returns 
and exchange rate volatility—1991 to 1998 and 1999 to 2002. To consolidate this result we 
re-estimated our model as specified in equation (1) to (3) for the two sub-periods.  The results 
are reported in Table 6 and confirm our main conclusion. Up to 1998 Japanese foreign ex-
change intervention was ineffective, but coincides with increased exchange rate volatility. 
Since 1999 Japanese foreign exchange i ntervention had the intended effect with evidence for 
less exchange rate volatility. Changing the boundary between the two sub-samples by one to 
six months prior to and after January 1, 1999 does change the meaningful results with respect 
to the mean equation (but less robust with respect to the volatility equation).  
5. CHANGE POINT DETECTION 
Although the sub-divided GARCH estimations give a more precise view of changing parame-
ter regimes in comparison to the global model, the segmentations might still be criticized as 
being arbitrary. We use a change point detector for ARCH models as proposed by Kokoszka 
and Leipus (2000) to identify sub-periods on a more systematic basis. Further, the change 
point detector provides us with an alternative approach to match increased volatility with in-
tervention periods.    14 
5.1. Specification 
 
The change point detector identifies changes in the data-generating parameters of a time se-
ries. Change point d etection has a long-standing tradition in the quality control of production 
processes (Lai 1995) and has also been applied to financial time series (Kokoszka and Leipus 
2000). We will base the change point detection on a standard GARCH(1,1) model with con-
stant mean return: 
 
, t t r e m + =   (7) 
) , 0 ( ~ |
1 t t h N
t- W e ,  (8) 
1
2
1 - - + + = t t t h h b ae w .  (9) 
 
In equation (7), rt are the daily returns of the yen/dollar exchange rate,  m is the constant mean. 
The disturbances et are assumed to be normally distributed conditional on the information Ot-1 
available at the time t-1 (8). The mean of the disturbances is assumed to be zero and the vari-
ance h t depends on the square of the lagged disturbance of the previous period et-1 and the 
variance of the previous period h t-1 (9).  
  Let k* denote a single change point in our time series generated by the GARCH model 
of equation (7) to (9). At k
* the data generating p arameter vector changes from 
( ) 1 1 1 1 , , b a w q =  to  ( ) 2 2 2 2 , , b a w q = . In other words, the change point detector identifies 
segments of sufficiently different volatility means.
28 The change point detector is the estima-
tor k ˆ of k
* defined by 
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28   In the stationary GARCH(1,1) model, the volatility mean is given by  ( ) b a w e - - = = 1 /
2
t t E Eh  (Bollerslev 
1986).   15 
Intuitively, the detector measures the distance Rk between the means of the two segments that 
are induced by the hypothetical change point k. The estimated change point is set where this 
distance becomes maximal. For the rare case that more than one maximum exists, the first one 
is chosen. Kokoszka and Leipus (2000) show that this estimator is consistent and converges in 
probability to the true change point k
* with rate 1/n. 
  We approach the multi-change point problem of finding a segmentation of the 
yen/dollar exchange rate series as a sequential single-change point detection problem. The 
observation p eriod is sub-divided into an increasing number of sub-periods, where the change 
points mark the boundaries. First, the change point detector is applied to the whole exchange 
rate series, which yields one change point and two sub-series. The detector then is applied to 
both sub-series, increasing the number of change points to three and the segments to four and 
so on.  
The starting point of our GARCH estimations performed in section 4 was set by the 
publication of Japanese foreign exchange intervention data starting from April 1, 1991. To 
obtain a less arbitrary starting point we extended the observation period to about 20 years 
starting in October 1983. The change point detection progresses in five steps and thereby 
theoretically sets 31 change points.29 We can then choose the change point closest to April 




Before we report the results, the following caveats must be noted. First, the change point d e-
tector as specified by Kokoszka and Leipus (2000) does not allow controlling for disturbances 
from other asset markets, which might distort the estimation results. Second, a synopsis of 
foreign exchange intervention periods and the change point estimates cannot be more than a 
coincidence study.  The change point detection does not provide a specific tool to test for the 
direct correlation or even causality between change points and intervention activity. Third, 
besides identifying segments of different volatility the change point detector provides a tool 
for non-arbitrary data segmentation. 
  Figure  3 shows the results of the change point detection. The upper panel plots the 
interventions in billion yen. For the period before 1991, we use monthly changes in official 
                                                   
29   We stop subdividing a segment when its length is either less than 250 points or when a new segment of less 
than 50 points would be cut off in the next segmentation step. For our sample, this reduces the total number 
of change points to 17 and the number of segments to 18.   16 
foreign reserves as a proxy for the interventions, because de facto  data are not available. The 
lower panels show different numbers of change points at the consecutive steps.
30  
  The first change point in early March 1995 corresponds to the period when Japanese 
(and US) monetary authorities increased their efforts to reverse the record high of the Japa-
nese yen of about 80 yen/dollar. The next change points are set in September 1985—the time 
of the Plaza Accord—and in September 1999 during the 1999 intervention period. In the third 
step, additional change points are set in April 1991 one month before the 1991 interventions, 
and in June 1998 when massive yen purchases tried to prevent the yen falling during the 
Japanese financial crisis. Additional change points are set in June 2000 after the 2000 inter-
vention cluster and December 2000 shortly before the 2001 intervention period. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Increasing the number of segments and change points we observe a concentration of change 
points in the 1990s, but it gets difficult to associate change points with intervention events. In 
the year 2002 the change point detector does not associate foreign exchange intervention with 
increased volatility. Furthermore, testing for the robustness of the change point estimation 
process we find that the location of change points is sensitive to the length and starting point 
of the observation period. This indicates the need for further research on this very recent ap-
proach to identify volatility clusters.  
5.3. Change Point Segmentation and GARCH Estimation 
 
Independent from the starting point, the change point d etector is a tool to obtain non-arbitrary 
segmentation of the volatility series. We can use any of these new segments for local GARCH 
estimations. We chose the segments provided by the third step for two reasons. First, a change 
point is set on April 23, 1991 close to the beginning of our Ministry of Finance data sample. 
Second, at the subsequent steps several segments are too short for  reliable GARCH estima-
tion.  
  The results of the respective local GARCH estimations are reported in Table 6. For the 
second sub-period from 1999 to 2002 the results are in concordance with the previous local 
estimations. Foreign exchange intervention is effective and volatility less. For the first sub-
period from 1991-1998 the results are mixed. In particular in the first period from April 1991 
to February 1995, the b1 coefficient for the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention is 
                                                   
30   The first step, which sets the first change point on March 1, 1995, is omitted for brevity.    17 
negative and highly significant. Yen appreciation is associated with dollar purchases provid-
ing evidence for possible endogeneity bias.
31 For the years 1991 up early 1995 foreign ex-
change intervention seems to have increased exchange rate volatility. After that time and up to 
mid 1998 the impact seems negative, but at an insignificant level.    
6. INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS 
The finding that Japanese foreign exchange intervention has affected the yen/dollar exchange 
rate so clearly after 1999 is very robust and begs the question as to possible explanations. Af-
ter 1999 we couldn’t observe any fundamental change in the strategy of Japanese foreign ex-
change intervention with respect to intervention volume, number of events or volume per 
event (Figure 1 and Table 2). Given the high degree of capital mobility b etween Japan and the 
US, the probability for a portfolio balance effect is low. Further, as interest rates declined to 
zero in early 1999, there is little evidence that foreign exchange intervention announced a 
fundamental change in interest rate policy. Further, as Japanese foreign exchange intervention 
after 1999 was purely unilateral, the argument for enhanced effectiveness of co -ordinated in-
tervention does not hold. 
  Given the caveat that the period since 1999 is too short to conclude that Japan’s for-
eign exchange intervention will be also effective in the future, the following explanations for 
effective Japanese foreign exchange intervention (after 1999) might apply. 
First, there is the portfolio equilibration function of Japanese foreign exchange inter-
vention as outlined by Goyal and McKinnon (2003). Based on a sustained saving surplus, 
Japan has generated high current account surpluses for more than two decades. The respective 
net capital exports have produced a huge stock of Japanese net international foreign assets, 
which constitute an inherent and sustained appreciation pressure on the Japanese currency. 
Given Japan’s net external foreign asset position, successful foreign exchange inter-
vention can be explained with a simple market clearing condition, assuming that current ac-
count (CA), net capital flows (KA) and changes in official foreign reserves (DRES) add up to 
zero:  
 
DRESt + CAt + KAt = 0                                         (11) 
 
                                                   
31   Watanabe and Harada (2001) find a similar result that they interpret in the same way.   18 
Capital flows are assumed exogenous. If Japanese private investors decide to repatriate parts 
of their foreign assets, they sell US dollar treasuries and convert the earnings into yen (buying 
yen). The yen comes under appreciation pressure.  
Two possible adjustment channels then apply. If the government decides to tolerate 
the appreciation (DRESt = 0), the decline in the net capital exports will be matched by an 
equal decline in the current account surplus, which is achieved via appreciation. If the gov-
ernment wants to sustain the current account at the present level (CAt = const.), the changes in 
net capital inflows have to be matched by a respective change of foreign reserves, which cor-
responds to foreign exchange intervention. If all additional net capital inflows are absorbed by 
official currency purchases, the exchange rate and the current account remain constant.32 The 
original fo reign investment position is restored. Only the structure of Japanese foreign assets 
has changed. Public foreign assets are substituted by private foreign assets. Foreign exchange 
intervention is successful.
33 
  While the portfolio equilibration approach provides a possible rationale for successful 
Japanese foreign exchange intervention, it does not explain why the success started in 1999. 
To this end De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2003) provide an alternative explanation a pproach. 
Based on a framework where chartists and fundamentalists interact they argue that sterilized 
foreign exchange intervention can affect the exchange rate by reducing speculative noise. As 
exchange rates tend to take systematic deviations from their fundamentals, intervention could 
be effective by reducing the share of chartists in the market, thereby re-directing the exchange 
rate towards fundamentals. 
  De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2003) admit that occasional intervention is unlikely to be 
effective, as it has very unpredictable effects on the exchange rate. Instead they suggest that 
successful intervention  should be systematic following a clear pattern. Following this line of 
argument, Japanese foreign exchange intervention could be successful because—as outlined 
in section 4 —Japanese monetary authorities were (are) successful in establishing informal 
exchange rate targets or target zones which enhance(d) the credibility of intervention.  
  Very recently, during the first half of the year 2003, Japanese monetary authorities 
were reported to have stabilized the yen between 115 yen to 122 yen to the dollar. Press re-
                                                   
32   To this end some observers have argued that the exchange rate of the Japanese yen would be at a level be-
tween 87 and 103 yen/dollar without the past foreign exchange intervention.  
33   Within this framework money supply can be assumed to be unchanged. When capital flows in, dollars are 
exchanged against yen and the domestic money supply (M1) declines. When the central bank buys the over-
supply of dollars, the money supply M1 is restored, but at the same time the monetary base expands. Finally 
the expansion of the monetary base is sterilized by the central bank and the holdings of domestic money and 
foreign reserves remain unchanged.   
   19 
ports give evidence that Japanese foreign exchange intervention credibly set (informal) target 
zones with respect to the exchange rate level and—as a side effect—reduced exchange rate 
volatility: “Previous intervention has not been so effective in keep ing the rate in such a tight 
range. As a result volume has dropped and currency traders have complained about a lack of 
volatility.”
34  
  Although this explanation approach seems quite plausible it raises the question as to 
the impact of systematic (rule-based) foreign exchange intervention on the money supply. De 
Grauwe and Grimaldi (2003) have not incorporated a money market into their model. We 
would argue however, that establishing a target zone would require subordinating fundamen-
tals (interest rates and monetary base) to the exchange rate target.  
  This brings us to Japan’s particular monetary framework after 1999. As is generally 
known, Japanese short-term money market interest rates touched the zero bound in early 1999 
which is generally perceived as a “liquidity trap”. The Bank of Japan’s official commitment 
to zero interest rates is in line with any growth (but not decline) of the monetary base. Indeed 
we observe that despite the stagnating economy the monetary base grew rapidly after 1999 
reaching yearly growth rates of 20% to 30%. In short, in the liquidity trap, at zero money 
market interest rates, the money supply is “infinite”.  
  Under these circumstances the borderline between sterilized and unsterilized foreign 
exchange intervention gets blurred. Disputes between the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of 
Finance about the pros and cons of sterilization indicate that even in the liquidity trap the ster-
ilization operations of the Bank of Japan have continued (Bank of Japan 2002: 273). But even 
if the monetary effects of foreign exchange intervention are neutralized, sterilization would be 
irrelevant if it coincided with a simultaneous increase of the monetary base. In September 
2001, the Nikkei Bank of Japan watcher reported that the yen amount released by foreign ex-
change interve ntion might not have been absorbed by open market operations  in to supply  
liquidity to the troublesome markets after September 11.
35 This could be hint that sterilization 
is not pursued completely and automatically as in the United States or the Euro Area.   
  Thus our estimations might provide evidence that Japanese monetary authorities move 
slightly towards an exchange rate policy similar to that observed by McKinnon and Schnabl 
(2003) for other soft or hard pegs in East Asia, which subordinate interest rate targets to ex-
change rate targets. At least  the official foreign reserves of the “free floater” Japan and the 
“hard peg” China tend to behave more and more similarly. 
                                                   
34   Pilling, David: Tokyo spends record amount to weaken yen (Financial Times August 8, 2003). 
35   Nihon keizai shinbun BOJ watcher September 19, 2001 (page 2).   20 
  All in all, our finding of successful Japanese foreign exch ange intervention after 1999 
would therefore be in line with the general wisdom on foreign exchange intervention as put 
forward by Jurgen sen (1983) and Dominguez (1998): Foreign exchange intervention can only 
be successful if it remains unsterilized or coincides with respective changes in the money 
supply—a tentative conclusion which needs further research.   
7. CONCLUSION 
During the post-bubble economic slump the sustained yen appreciation has triggered increas-
ing foreign exchange intervention. Our global GARCH estimation supports the recent find-
ings by Ito (2002) and Fatum and Hutchison (2002) that Japanese foreign exchange interve n-
tion has been successful.  Segmentation approaches that allow for local estimations reveal 
however, that the success depends on the time period.  
Up to 1998 there is no conclusive evidence for effective intervention as argued by Jur-
gensen (1983) and Dominguez (1998). After 1999 official Japanese foreign currency pur-
chases seem to have reached their targets supporting the arguments of Ito (2002) and Fatum 
and Hutchison (2002). In Section 6 we have provided two explanations for the changing pat-
tern. The most plausible explanation is that money supply is infinite in the liquidity trap and 
therefore sterilized intervention corresponds to unsterilized intervention. 
  We have also examined the impact of Japanese foreign exchange intervention on the 
volatility in the yen/dollar markets. The results were less conclusive than in our mean equa-
tions and the endogeneity problem cannot be solved  completely. The global estimation pro-
vided evidence that foreign exchange intervention increases exchange rate volatility as sug-
gested by Schwartz (1996), Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) and Galati and Melick (1999). 
For the local estimations the results are less clear-cut. In the period up to 1998 in some years 
foreign exchange intervention seems to have increased exchange rate volatility.  Since 1999 
however, we find evidence that interventions may have reduced e xchange rate volatility, 
which can be explained by the success of intervention.  
  Finally, the change point detector identified changes in the volatility parameter re-
gime, which could be—to some degree—matched with intervention periods. As the results are 
sensitive to the choice of the sample period, the application of this very young approach  to 
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Source:  Japanese Ministry of Finance. April 1991 – December 2002. Note different scales for 
Japan and the US (Figure 2).   24 









































































cumulative intervention (right scale)
dollars bought (yen sold)
dollars sold 
(yen bought)
Source: US Federal Reserve Board. Billion Dollars. April 1991 – December 2002. Note dif-
ferent scales for US and Japan (Figure 1). 
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Source: Datastream. Daily volatilities defined as square of daily percentage changes. The DM 
represents the euro since January 1999. 
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 Source: Datastream. Foreign exchange intervention in billion dollars. April 1991 – December 
2002. 
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Source: Datastream. Foreign exchange intervention in billion dollars. April 1991 – December 
2002. Volatility defined as 60 days rolling standard deviations of the daily percent yen/dollar 
exchange rate changes around day t.   28 
Figure 6: Foreign Exchange Intervention and Volatility Segmentation (1983–2002)  










Japan: Interventions on the Yen/USD market.



























































The first change point that is detected on the entire series is 03-01-1995. In the two resulting 
sub-series, the change points 09-20-1985 and 09-27-1999 are found (second panel). In the 
next step (third panel), the segmentation consists of the points 01-Mar-1984, 20-Sep -1985, 
23-Apr-1991, 01-Mar-1995, 09-Jun-1998, 27-Sep -1999, 09-Jun-2000. The next step (second 
panel from below) results in the segmentation 01-Mar-1984, 20-Sep-1985, 05-Jun-1986, 23-
Apr-1991, 08-Feb -1993, 01-Mar-1995, 06-Oct-1995, 09-Jun-1998, 20-Oct-1998, 27-Sep -
1999, 09-Jun-2000, and 21-Dec-2000. The last step closes with the segmentation 01-Mar-
1984, 20-Sep -1985, 05-Jun-1986, 12-May -1989, 23-Apr-1991, 03-Nov-1992, 08-Feb-1993, 
21-Sep-1993, 01-Mar-1995, 06-Oct-1995, 02-May-1997, 09-Jun-1998, 20-Oct-1998, 27-Sep -
1999, 09-Jun-2000, 21-Dec-2000, 15-Jun-2001. 
   29 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Yen/Dollar and Mark /Dollar Exchange Rates 
  yen/dollar  mark/dollar 
number of observations  3066  3066 
mean  -0.0057  0.0052 
standard deviation  0.7096  0.6587 
skewness  -0.6280  -0.0114 
kurtosis  7.9681  4.8316 
Jarque-Bera  3354.68  428.63 





Table 2: Summary Statistics for Bank of Japan and Federal Reserve Interventions 
  Bank of Japan  Federal Reserve 
total intervention days  215 (222)  22 (36) 
total transaction volume (billion dollars)  300.98 (308.77)  8.40 (17.2) 
percentage of interventions in the yen/dollar market  97.48%  48.83% 
unconditional intervention probability  7.01% (7.24%)  0.71% (1.17%) 
number of days with dollar purchases (yen sales)  182 (184)  18 (30) 
total amount of dollar purchases (billions)  263.36  7.30 
mean absolute value of dollar purchases (billions)  1.30  0.41 
number of days with dollar sales (yen purchases)  33 (38)  4 (6) 
total amount of dollar sales (billions)  37.62  1.00 
mean absolute value of dollar sales (billions)  1.14  0.25 
 Source: Japan: Ministry of Finance and Federal Reserve Board. Yen/dollar interventions (In-
terventions against all currencies in brackets). 
   30 
 
Table 3: Global GARCH (1,2) Estimation for Equation (1) to (3)  
  estimate  standard error   z-statistic  probability 
b0  -6.4E-5  1.1E-4  -0.57  0.57 
b1 (It)  0.86***  0.30  2.91  0.00 
b2 (Nikkei  t)   -0.01  0.01  -1.47  0.14 
b3 (DOWt)  0.04***  0.01  2.90  0.00 
g1 (|It|)  4.8E-3**  2.1E-3  2.33  0.02 
g 2 (Nikkei t
2)  3.9E-3*  2.1E-3  1.83  0.07 
g 3 (DOWt
2)  8.5E-3*  4.4E-3  1.95  0.05 
w  1.8E-6**  7.3E-7  2.42  0.02 
a1  0.07***  0.02  3.64  0.00 
b1  0.39  0.27  1.45  0.15 
b2  0.46*  0.25  1.84  0.07 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors according to Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). 
* denotes significance at the 10 percent level. ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level.   31 
Table 4: Local GARCH Estimation for Equation (1) to (3) – Unlagged Intervention by Year 
  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
number of events  4  23  49  55  43  5  3  3  12  4  7  7 
total volume (bn. $)  -0.50  -5.53  23.88  20.44  53.68  15.32  -8.17  -23.42  62.62  28.16  26.72  32.54 
volume per event  -0.13  -0.24  0.49  0.37  1.25  3.06  -2.72  -7.81  5.22  7.04  3.82  4.65 
GARCH specific.  (1,1)  (1,2)  (4,4)  (1,2)  (2,1)  (1,1)  (1,1)  (1,1)  (1,1)  (2,1)  (1,1)  (1,1) 
b1  -17.51  3.83  -2.54  -0.47  1.20  1.20  1.90  0.29  1.62***  1.17***  0.72**  0.87*** 
standard error   -19.36  3.43  1.79  1.53  1.05  1.31  3.11  0.26  0.25  0.20  0.37  0.32 
z-statistic  -0.90  1.11  -1.41  -0.31  1.15  0.91  0.61  1.11  6.37  5.66  1.94  2.65 
probability  0.37  0.26  0.16  0.75  0.25  0.35  0.54  0.26  0.00  0.00  0.05  0.01 
g1  0.00  0.00  0.02*  0.01***  0.01***  0.02  0.02  -0.00**  -0.00  -0.00*  3.1E-3  -0.00 
standard error   0.09  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.04  0.01  0.00  0.00  2.5E-2  0.00 
z-statistic  0.00  0.17  1.61  2.19  3.31  1.38  0.56  -2.78  -0.40  -1.73  -0.12  -0.90 
probability  0.99  0.86  0.10  0.02  0.00  0.16  0.57  0.01  0.68  0.08  0.90  0.36 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors according to Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). * denotes significance at the 10 percent level. ** de-
notes significance at the 5 percent level. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level.   32 
Table 5: Local GARCH Estimation for Equation (1) to (3) – Unlagged Intervention by Intervention Clusters 
































number of events  4  23  49  55  48  6  16  14 
total volume (bn. $)  -0.50  -5.53  23.88  20.44  69.00  -31.58  90.42  59.26 
volume per event  -0.13  -0.24  0.49  0.37  1.44  -5.26  5.65  4.23 
GARCH specific.  (1,1)  (1,1)  (2,3)  (1,3)  (1,3)  (2,1)  (1,2)  (1,1) 
b1  -28.01  3.81  -2.68  -1.20  0.14  0.49  1.48***  0.93*** 
standard error   18.79  4.20  1.79  1.47  0.72  1.25  0.12  0.24 
z-statistic  -1.49  0.91  -1.50  -0.81  0.19  0.40  11.93  3.85 
probability  0.14  0.36  0.13  0.41  0.85  0.69  0.00  0.00 
g1  1E-6  3E-3  0.02  0.01***  0.02***  0.05  -3.7E-3***  -2.3E-3*** 
standard error   0.08  3.6E-3  0.02  3E-3  0.01  0.05  4.7E-4  7.6E-4 
z-statistic  0.00  -1.34  1.13  2.12  2.95  0.92  -7.87  -3.07 
probability  1.00  0.18  0.26  0.03  0.00  0.35  0.00  0.00 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors according to Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). * denotes significance at the 10 percent level. ** de-
notes significance at the 5 percent level. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level.   33 
Table 6: GARCH Estimations for Equation (1) to (3) – 2 Sub-periods  
  1991-1998  1999-2002 
number of events  185  30 
total volume (bio. $)  75.7  150.04 
volume per event  0.41  5.00 
GARCH specific.  (1,4)  (4,3) 
b1  0.24  1.02*** 
standard error   0.63  0.21 
z-statistic  0.37  4.94 
probability  0.71  0.00 
g1  0.03***  -1.0E-3 
standard error   8E-3  7.5E-4 
z-statistic  3.65  -1.33 
probability  0.00  0.18 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors according to Bollerslev and 
Wooldridge (1992). * d enotes significance at the 10 percent level. ** denotes 
significance at the 5 percent level. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent 
level. 
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Table 6: GARCH Estimations of Model (1) to (3) with Unlagged Intervention Variable 
in the Mean Equation on Se gments Identified by the Change Point Detector (10) 










Model order   GARCH(3,1)  GARCH(1,1)  GARCH(1,1)  GARCH(1,1)  GARCH(1,1) 
b1  -3.54***  0.63  1.81***  1.06***  0.91*** 
std. error  1.20  0.45  0.08  0.24  0.25 
Z-statistic  -2.95  1.41  23.05  4.39  3.70 
probability  0.00  0.16  0.00  0.00  0.00 
g1  0.02**  -3.7E-4  -5.1E-3***  -4.2E-3***  -2.1E-3*** 
std. error  0.01  6.5E-4  6.3E-4  1.0E-3  7.2E-4 
Z-statistic  2.38  -0.57  -8.04  -4.06  -2.94 
probability  0.02  0.57  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors according to Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). 
* denotes significance at the 10 percent level. ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
*** d enotes significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
 